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IBM v. Commissioner: The Effects Test in the 
EEC 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The competition rules of the European Economic Community (EEC) date 
back to the very inception of the EEC thirty years ago. l This Note will consider 
the effectiveness of these rules with an analysis of their enforcement by the 
EEC Commission (Commission).2 In examining the effectiveness of the EEC 
competition rules, this Note will focus on the EEC's jurisdiction in this area. In 
IBM v. Commissioner, (IBM)3 the Commission and IBM reached a settlement 
which avoided jurisdictional objections by IBM.4 The settlement presents issues 
concerning the jurisdiction of EEC institutions over multinational corporations 
which violate the competition rules of the EEC. In addressing these issues, this 
Note will begin with a background examination of the EEC competition rules. 
Next, this Note will consider the history and suspension of the Commission's 
investigation into IBM's practices within the EEC. The jurisdictional issues 
presented by IBM will be analyzed through a comparison of the two different 
approaches to the "effects test" taken by the United States and the EEC.5 This 
Note will first show that the EEC has evolved a concept of jurisdiction akin to 
the "effects test," but which remains based in territorial principles. IBM, there-
fore, is significant as an example of the limits of EEC jurisdiction under current 
theory. Finally, this Note will conclude from the IBM undertaking that the EEC, 
in cases involving large multinational corporations, will probably try to settle 
cases to avoid jurisdictional problems. 
I The EEC was formed on March 25, 1957 with the signing of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community. March 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 3 done at Rome,Jan. I, 1958 [hereinafter Treaty 
of Rome]. The EEC currently consists of twelve Member States: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, West Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain, and Portugal. 
The EEC is one of three organizations which together form the European Communities. In addition 
to the EEC, there is the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Community 
of Atomic Energy (EURATOM). See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS (2d. ed. 1984) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST]. 
2 All three communities are under the administration of the Commission of the European Com-
munities. See generally Treaty of Rome, supra note I, at arts. 155-63. See Regulation 17, art. 15(1), 
reprinted in I Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 2541 (Council Feb. 6, 1962). The Commission consists of 
fourteen members from the Member States and has power to enforce EEC antitrust policy by inves-
tigations, proceedings, and fines. It may issue cease and desist orders and impose fines to enforce 
these orders. 
• IBM v. Commissioner, 41 Common Mkt. L.R. 147 (1984). 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 52-60. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 45-60. 
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II. BACKGROUND OF COMPETITION RULES IN THE EEC 
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the EEC.6 The principle objective 
in establishing the EEC was to unify the economies of Member States into an 
integrated Common Market.7 This objective is evident in the EEC competition 
rules. Articles 85( 1) and (2) of the Treaty of Rome declare agreements and 
concerted practices between businesses void if they are intended to restrict 
competition and consequently affect trade between the Member States of the 
EEC. B Article 86 bans abusive practices by enterprises enjoying a "dominant 
position" within the EEC.g 
To discern whether the ban in Article 86 applies, it is necessary to consider 
first, whether an enterprise's practices are abusive, and second, if the enterprise 
holds a dominant market position. 1O If an activity is found to be an abusive 
practice, the next issue is whether the entity in question maintains a dominant 
position in the EEC.1I The European Court of Justice (European Court)12 has 
held that a dominant position exists if certain factors are present. For example, 
6 See supra note 1. 
7Id. 
s Article 85(1) states: 
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their objective or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in par-
ticular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplemen-
tary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts. 
Treaty of Rome, supra note I, at art. 85. 
9Id. at art. 86. 
10 Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits practices which consist of the following: 
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices or of any 
other inequitable trading conditions; 
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers; 
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent supplies, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of additional 
supplies which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with 
the subject of such contract. 
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, at an. 86. 
II See infra note 13. 
12 The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg is the final interpreter of the Treaty of Rome 
and has the power to review the decisions of the Commission. See ABA ANTITRUST, supra note 1, at 
575. 
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if an enterprise controls up to forty-seven percent of the market for its product 
when the next nearest competitor has a significantly smaller market share, that 
enterprise may be in a dominant position.13 In addition to market share, the 
enterprise's technological lead over its competitors,14 its sales network and an 
absence of competition are factors relevant to determining dominance. 15 If an 
enterprise's activity is found to be an abusive practice of its dominant market 
position, such a practice is void and will not fall within the exemption from 
competition rules allowed in Article 85(3).16 Article 85(3) allows the Commission 
to exempt an enterprise from Article 85(1) if the enterprise's practices have 
certain beneficial consequences, though these practices have restrictive effects 
on trade.I7 The Commission may also grant a negative clearance to the enter-
prise. ls The negative clearance declares that its practices do not contain the 
grounds necessary for the Commission to act under Articles 85 and 86. 19 
The Treaty of Rome, through the centralizing of administration, has ad-
vanced towards its goal of a unified system of trade within the EEC. Many of 
the largest corporations active in the EEC, however, are subsidiaries of multi-
national corporations with origins outside of the EEC.20 This situation presents 
"See Hoffman-La Roche & Co. A.G. v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, 466, 26 
Common Mkt. L.R. 211, 218 (1978). See also United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 207, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978). The European Court in United Brands emphasized the 
power of an enterprise to act independantly of its competitors as a sign of a dominant position. Id. at 
461. 
14 See Hoffman-La Roche, supra note 13, at 219. 
15Id. 
16 Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome allows the Commission to grant an exemption from Article 
85(1) if certain conditions are satisfied. Article 85(3) provides: 
3. The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; 
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, 
and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a sub-
stantial part of the products in question. 
Treaty of Rome, supra note I, at art. 85(3). 
17 Id. 
18 The "negative clearance" is a declaration from the Commission that an agreement provides no 
grounds for it to act under Article 85(1) or Article 86. The Commission issues such letters pursuant 
to Article 85(3) and its powers under Regulation 17, art. 2. 
19Id. 
2<l See Sierck, Emerging Common Market Antitrust Enforcement Trends: A Survey, 7 CAL. WEST. INT'L L.J. 
418, 442-43 (1977). In a 1973 survey by the Commission, 1,202 U.S. multinational corporations 
reported sales of 737 billion units of account compared to 516 billion units from 2,493 EEC multi-
nationals. 
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a jurisdictional problem for the EEC because an enterprise's activity, which 
affects trade within the EEC, may occur partially or completely outside EEC 
territory. For example, International Business Machines (IBM), a United States 
corporation, has a market share of two-thirds of computers sold in the EEC.21 
IBM's status as a multinational corporation presents the issue of the extent of 
the Commission's jurisdiction over an activity which affects trade within the 
EEC, but which occurs partially or completely outside EEC territory.22 
III. IBM V. COMMISSIONER 
IBM v. Commissioner began with a letter sent to IBM from the Commission on 
December 19, 1980. This letter contained a Statement of Objections, by the 
Commission's Director General for Competition to IBM.23 The Statement 
charged IBM with violating Article 86 of the Treaty. In particular, the Statement 
alleged that, in marketing its System/370 mainframe computer, IBM: 1) failed 
to supply other manufacturers with technical information quickly enough to 
allow them to produce competitive products for use with the System/370; 2) 
offered its System/370 central processing units (CPU) with a memory in excess 
of what was needed for testing and that extra memory was included in the 
purchase price; 3) offered the System/370 CPUs with software in excess of the 
basic requirements, which excess software IBM included in the purchase price; 
and, 4) refused to offer software installation services to customers who used a 
competitor's CPU with IBM software.2' 
IBM applied to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for per-
mission to appeaJ.25 IBM objected to the Commission's investigation on three 
grounds. First, the Commission failed to consider international comity where 
many of the acts concerned occurred outside of the EEC and in the United 
States.26 Second, the Statement of Objections breached the rights of the defen-
dant by reserving to the Commission the power to make further objections.27 
Finally, the full Commission did not adopt these charges against IBM.2S The 
Court dismissed IBM's application and refused to hear an appeal until the 
21 See. Coming to Terms with Big Blue. TiME, Aug. 13, 1984 at 73. 
In the area of high technology. Western Europe had a trade deficit of ten billion dollars in 1982. 
The U.S. and Japan together hold 80% of th~ world market in electronic microprocessing. See Falling 
Back in a Critical Race, TIME. Aug. 13. 1984. at 72. 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 41-60. 
23 See IBM v. E.C. Commission. 1981 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2639. 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 635 (1981). 
24 See Commission Press Release I P(84)290. Brussels. Belgium (Aug. 2. 1984) ~ 6, 41 Common Mkt. 
L.R. 148 (1984). 
25 See supra note 23. 
26 IBM. supra note 23. at 638-39. 
27 !d. at 638. 
28 Id. 
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Commission reached a final decision.29 Consequently, the issue of jurisdiction 
over IBM's actions in the United States was never addressed. 
Formal hearings before the Commission began in February, 1982 and again 
inJune, 1983.30 Negotiations between IBM and the Commission took place after 
the first hearing and led to an agreement on August 2, 1984.31 On August 2, 
1984, Commissioner Andriessen announced in a letter that the Commission 
would accept marketing policy changes proposed by IBM in an undertaking 
and would suspend the ten year investigation of IBM.32 
According to the Undertaking, 
[i]f IBM first announces a new System/370 product outside the EEC, 
for which it is or will be seeking orders for delivery within the EEC, 
then IBM will either announce such product within the EEC on the 
same date as such announcement outside the EEC, or treat that 
date as if it were the date of announcement within the EEC for the 
purpose of this Undertaking.33 
In addition, IBM will make available its System/370 central processing units 
without main memory, or with only such memory capacity as is strictly required 
to allow testing of the CPU.34 IBM will make "interface" and "attachment" 
information available within 120 days of its announcement of a new or modified 
product.35 The Undertaking will not require IBM to respond to requests for 
information before expiration of the relevant time period and after expiration, 
IBM will have fifteen days to respond to requests. 36 IBM will reserve the right 
to supply interface information subject to "certain conditions" necessary to 
ensure the protection of "IBM's legitimate interest."37 IBM will also supply 
information to the Commission, at the Commission's request, to allow the Com-
mission to determine the extent to which IBM is implementing the Undertak-
ing.3s Finally, the Undertaking will not be enforceable by the Commission or 
any other national authority or agency and any future actions against IBM 
would rely exclusively upon Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.39 
29Id. at 661-62. 
'041 Common Mkt. L.R. 149 (1984). Statement of Mr. Frans Andriessen, on behalf of the Com-
mission, accepting an undertaking from IBM to change its business practices in the EEC. 
31/d. at 147-51. 
32 Id. 
" Id. at 152. 
"Id. at 153. 
35 /d. at 152. 
'6Id. at 153. 
37 /d. 
38/d. at 155. 
'9Id. 
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EFFECTS TEST OF JURISDICTION IN THE EEC 
The first provision of the Undertaking, concerning introduction of new prod-
ucts, is the most significant concession from IBM for the purposes of analyzing 
the development of jurisdiction doctrine in the EEC. In this provision, IBM 
agreed to treat System/370 products announced outside of the EEC as if the 
announcement occurred inside the EEC.40 This removes, by agreement, poten-
tial nullification of the timetable for information release to which IBM agreed. 
Without this concession, IBM, by introducing its products outside of the EEC 
and allowing the interface information to trickle into the EEC, could delay the 
introduction of information into the EEC,4l This result would be detrimental 
to its competitors in the EEC.42 Given the current development of principles of 
EEC jurisdiction, such an action would place IBM beyond Commission juris-
diction.43 Although the Commission has asserted its jurisdiction over actions 
outside of the EEC which have effects on trade within the EEC, this view has 
not yet been accepted by the European Court.44 Instead, the European Court 
has developed a jurisdiction test which is in essence a modified effects test more 
limited in reach than the effects test used by the United States.45 
In the United States, the "effects test" for jurisdiction originated in United 
States v. Alcoa,46 where Judge Learned Hand held that U.S. courts may assert 
jurisdiction over actors and actions outside of U.S. territory if they create 
anticompetitive effects within the United States.47 This use of jurisdiction derives 
from the objective territorial principle.48 Commentators, however, do not con-
sider it to be a legitimate use of that doctrine.49 U.S. courts have used the 
"effects test" to claim jurisdiction over foreign parties acting outside the territory 
of the United States if these actions have effects within the United States. 50 
40ld. at 152. 
41 Note, Antitrust Law: Commission of the European Communities Suspends Proceedings Against International 
Business Machines Corporation, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189,194 (1985). 
42 See supra note 2 I, at 73. 
43 See infra text accompanying notes 52-60. 
44 See infra note 56. 
45 See infra text accompanying notes 45-60. 
46 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
47 Id. at 443. 
48 See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d. ed. 1981) 157. 
!d. 
Traditionally, territorial inhibitions were overcome only when the State itself was the victim 
of the unlawful conduct, or when the conduct was commonly accepted as criminal by the 
nations concerned and, for some reason, the criminal had not been subject to prosecution by 
the state where the offense occurred. It was thus questionable whether exception to the 
general presumption of territoriality could be readily stretched to include matters of economic 
policy on which nations differed. 
49 !d. 
50 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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While the broad scope of this principle was recently narrowed in Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,51 the test has produced considerable objections 
from outside the United States. 52 
In the EEC, the Commission has begun to assert its jurisdiction by using the 
effects test. The Commission, in Commission v. Imperial Chemical Industries,53 
asserted that if the practices of an enterprise had an effect on EEC trade, there 
was "no need to examine whether the enterprise which is the cause of these 
restrictions of competition have their seat within or outside the Community."54 
In its initial decision, the Commission decided that the practices in question 
constituted a conspiracy to fix the price of dyes sold within the EEC. The 
Commission claimed that it had jurisdiction, in making its decision, over a 
corporation which was based outside of the EEC.55 In an appeal to the European 
Court, the Commission used the effects doctrine as an alternate ground for 
jurisdiction. It claimed, as a primary ground for jurisdiction, that the foreign 
corporation was constructively present in the EEC through its subsidiaries.56 
The Court agreed that the defendant was present in the EEC through its 
subsidiary and found that the Commission had jurisdiction over the parent 
located outside of the EEC.57 
Further, in Europemballage Corp. v. Commission,5s Continental Can, a U.S. cor-
poration, incorporated Europemballage as its subsidiary in Europe.59 Continen-
tal Can, through Europemballage, engaged in a series of takeovers of companies 
in the EEC. Due to these takeovers, the Commission charged Continental Can 
with violating Articles 85 and 86.60 In an appeal to the European Court, the 
Court held, as it had in Imperial Chemical Industries, that the parent corporation 
51 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The Court suggested a conflicts-of-law analysis by which U.S. courts 
could determine whether they have jurisdiction over foreign parties. Id. at 614. Subsequently, the 
Third Circuit adopted the Timberlane approach in Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 
1287 (3d Cir. 1979). Some factors the Third Circuit considered important to a court contemplating 
asserting jurisdiction were: "1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; 2. Nationality of the 
parties; and 3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad 
.... " Id. at 1297-98. 
52 See]. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 47 at 102-06. U.S. assertion of jurisdiction has resulted 
in foreign legislative action designed to block discovery connected to U.S. proceedings. Id. 
5' Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Commission, 12 ].0. Eur. Comm. (No L 195), 8 Comm. 
Mkt. L.R. D 23 (1969), a/I'd, 1972 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 619, II Common Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972). 
54 Id. at 593. 
55Id. at 628. 
56 Id. at 628-30. 
57Id. The Court did not adopt the Advocate General's position in favor of the effects test but rested 
its judgment on the conclusion that the defendant acted within the territory of the EEC through its 
subsidiaries. 
"Commission v. Europemballage Corp., II Common Mkt. L.R. Dll, D35 (1971), rev'd on other 
grounds, 1973 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 215, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973). 
59Id. at 202. 
60 Id. at 202-05. 
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was constructively present in the EEC through its subsidiary and consequently, 
that the Commission had jurisdiction over the foreign defendants.61 
The European Court, by holding a parent corporation to be constructively 
present in the EEC through its incorporated subsidiary, was able to expand the 
Commission's jurisdiction over foreign corporations, while theoretically main-
taining adherence to the territorial principle of jurisdiction. Under such a 
modified effects test, the Commission probably could have successfully asserted 
jurisdiction over IBM. Specifically, the Commission could have claimed that 
IBM, through its act of introducing the System/370 in the EEC was construc-
tively present in the EEC. A difficulty with this solution, however, is that it is 
limited in effectiveness to the product at issue. For example, if IBM introduced 
a new computer system outside of the EEC it is likely that this system will enter 
Europe at some point. Probably, orders for IBM products from the EEC will 
introduce the new product to EEC consumers.62 This is likely because IBM is 
the largest computer maker in the world, and has two-thirds of the EEC com-
puter market.63 But by introducing a system abroad, IBM can argue that the 
Commission has no jurisdiction over it because it is a foreign corporation acting 
outside of EEC territory.64 The Commission may not be able to attain jurisdiction 
over IBM, though IBM's actions may have significant effects within the EEC, 
because the Court has yet to adopt the effects test. 65 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Commission and the European Court, in order to acquire jurisdiction 
over IBM when its actions occur abroad, may have to widen the scope of its 
jurisdiction test to a degree approximating the scope of the effects test used by 
the United States. This expansion will probably weaken the link the European 
Court has maintained, in its decisions to date, with traditional territorial prin-
ciples. A move away from the territorial principles of jurisdiction, however, is 
not one that the European Court is prepared to undertake despite the Com-
mission's arguments on its behalf.66 By remaining with the premise that action 
must take place within the territory of the EEC to confer jurisdiction on the 
Commission, the Court is limiting the jurisdiction of the Commission. The 
Commission has avoided this limit in jurisdiction by agreement with IBM. IBM 
has agreed to treat products announced outside the EEC as if they were an-
61 [d. at 221-22. 
62 See supra note 41. 
6S See supra note 21. 
64 See supra note 40, at 193-95. 
65 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57 
66 /d. 
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nounced within the EEC.67 In essence, IBM has agreed that the Commission 
has jurisdiction over computer products it introduced outside the EEC. Until 
the European Court formally adopts the effects test of jurisdiction, the Com-
mission may, in the future, seek other such agreements to its jurisdiction from 
multinational corporations based outside of the EEC and whose activities affect 
trade in the EEC. 
Margaret La 
67 See supra text accompanying note 29. 
